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Abstract 
Economically developed countries are confronting the aging of society. Especially, their 
respective shares of elderly people among the total population in Japan are highest in 
the world. Moreover, the labor participation rates of older people in Japan are higher 
than in other OECD countries. Several reasons underlie the increased labor 
participation of older people in Japan. One reason is the subsidy for the labor supply of 
elderly people. This paper presents an examination of how this subsidization of the 
labor supply of elderly people affects the labor participation of young and elderly people 
and unemployment. As a result, in a temporary equilibrium, an increase in the subsidy 
raises the employment rate of elderly people. However, in a steady state in a closed 
economy, this subsidy has little effect on the employment rate of elderly people. 
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1. Introduction 
In an aging society, the labor participation rate of elderly people increases. Comparison 
with other OECD countries shows that the labor participation rate of elderly people is 
high in Japan, as shown in Fig. 1, but why is the labor participation rate of elderly 
people so high in Japan? Several reasons can be inferred. In Japan, the age at which 
pension benefits start is 65 years old. Therefore, older people must work until that age 
to obtain a labor income for subsistence. As another reason, government policy can be 
considered. In a society with fewer children, the working population size continues to 
decrease. The shortage of working age population represents a severe problem because 
the social security system cannot be maintained. The social security system is financed 
mainly as a pay-as-you-go system. Therefore, if the working population decreases, then 
sufficient revenues cannot be collected to provide for social security benefits. 
 
[Insert Fig. 1 around here.] 
 
Our paper sets a model with labor of two types: young labor and elderly labor. Using 
it, we examine how an aging society and a subsidy for elderly labor affect the 
employment rate and the labor participation of elderly people. Consequently, in a 
monopolistic labor union model, an aging society brought about by an increase in the 
survival rate and the subsidy for elderly labor raise the employment rate and labor 
participation rate of elderly people in a temporary equilibrium model. This result is 
consistent with the real world. 
However, considering the steady state in a closed economy under which capital 
accumulation is considered, the effect of this subsidy on the employment rate and labor 
participation of elderly people is slight because of a decrease in the wage rate. This 
result demonstrates that the subsidy for elderly people has a positive short-run effect 
on the labor supply of elderly people. 
In addition to the results described above, our manuscript presents consideration of 
the labor participation of young and elderly people: specifically, whether they are 
substitutive or complementary. If young labor and elderly labor are substitutive, then 
3 
 
an increase in the demand for elderly labor reduces the demand for young labor, 
representing a crowding effect. Our paper presents derivation of the complementary 
relation between young and elderly labor in the temporary equilibrium: both the young 
labor supply and labor supply of elderly people rises. However, at the steady state in 
closed economy, although the young labor supply does not change, the elderly labor rises 
because of the subsidy. This result, which exhibits neither a substitutive nor a 
complementary relation, is partially consistent with the real world. 
Some reports of the related literature describe examination of the labor participation 
of elderly people. Hu (1979) reports that the retirement age is earlier because of pension 
benefits. Christian, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2010) also examine how the pension 
system affects the retirement age. As demonstrated by Butrica, Smith, and Steuerle 
(2006), the extension of the retirement age has a positive effect on the income and 
pension benefit because the household can obtain more labor income and can pay a 
higher pension premium. Moreover, this extension contributes to pension system 
sustainability. However, Lachance (2007) shows the negative effects of the extension of 
retirement age on the welfare. Cocco and Gomes (2012) and Aísa, Pueyo, and Sanso 
(2012) examine how an increase in longevity affects individual saving and retirement 
decisions. Aísa, Pueyo, and Sanso (2012) derive that an increase in longevity raises the 
labor participation rate of elderly people. An increase in household savings accumulates 
capital stock. Then the wage rate of marginal labor productivity increases. Because of 
this effect, retirement occurs earlier, as demonstrated by Matsuyama (2008). 
Some empirical studies examine the effects of the subsidy policy for elderly labor. 
Kangasharju (2007) shows a positive effect of the subsidy on the labor supply of elderly 
people. Acs and Toder (2007) derive that a subsidy policy for the labor supply of elderly 
people is more efficient than an income transfer policy. Ohta (2007) examines whether 
the relation between young and elderly labor is substitutive or complementary, and 
derives that the relation between the two groups of laborers is not always substitutive. 
The relation is determined based on the form of employment or the type of industry. 
The theoretical studies of our manuscript are consistent with the results of empirical 
studies. 
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The remainder of this paper includes the following. Section 2 describes setting of the 
model, derivation of the temporary equilibrium, and examination of the effect of an 
aging society. The subsidy of elderly labor is explained in section 3. Section 4 derives 
the steady state equilibrium in a closed economy with numerical examples. The final 
section presents conclusions of the studies described in this paper. 
 
2. The Model 
This model has agents of three types: households, firms, and the government. Moreover, 
the labor union exists. The population size is unity in each generation. No population 
growth exists. 
2.1 Household 
In this model, individuals in households exist in two periods: young and old periods. 
During the young period, the younger people work inelastically to obtain wage income 
ݓ௧. 
However, this model includes involuntary unemployment. If people cannot obtain a 
job, then they can receive unemployment benefit ݑ௧. Individuals must provide for their 
own consumption during the old period ܿ௧ାଵ, in addition to leisure. Utility function ௧ܷ 
is assumed as 
௧ܷ ൌ ݈݊ܿ௧ାଵ ൅ ܸ, (1) 
where ܸ denotes the utility from the leisure during the old period. If the individuals 
enjoy the leisure in old period, then they can obtain utility ܸ. Actually, ܸ is assumed 
to be distributed uniformly in ሾ0, തܸሿ.1 There exists heterogeneity of the utility from the 
leisure in individuals. Our paper presents consideration of survival rate ݌. Presumably, 
some younger people cannot live in the older period. 
Defining ݏ௧௪ as saving, the budget constraint of working people in the young period 
is 
ݏ௧௪ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ߠሻݓ௧, (2) 
                                                  
1 This setting is roughly equivalent to that reported by Maeda and Momota (2002). Maeda and 
Momota (2002) assume that the health condition is distributed uniformly. The utility from retirement 
differs among elderly people. 
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where ߬ and ߠ respectively denote the tax rate for the unemployment benefit and the 
policy for the subsidy for the labor supply of elderly people or pension benefit. The 
budget constraint of unemployed people during the young period, that is, the saving of 
unemployment people, ݏ௧௨ is shown as 
ݏ௧௨ ൌ ݑ௧. (3) 
In the older period, older people choose whether to work or enjoy leisure. The budget 
constraint of the older people working both in young and old periods ܿ௧ାଵ௪ is 
ܿ௧ାଵ௪ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵሺ1 െ ߬ െ ߠሻݓ௧ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓ௧ାଵ ൅ ݌௧ାଵ, (4) 
where ܴ௧, ߪ and ݌௧ାଵ respectively denote the interest rate for saving, the subsidy rate 
of elderly labor, and the pension benefit. Consumption in older people who work in the 
young period and unemployed people in the old period ܿ௧ାଵ௪௨ are shown as 
ܿ௧ାଵ௪௨ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵሺ1 െ ߬ െ ߠሻݓ௧ ൅ ݌௧ାଵ. (5) 
Consumption by older people who are unemployed status during the young period and 
who work in the old period ܿ௧ାଵ௨௪ is 
ܿ௧ାଵ௨௪ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵݑ௧ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓ௧ାଵ ൅ ݌௧ାଵ. (6) 
Consumption by older people who are unemployed in both the young and old period 
ܿ௧ାଵ௨ is shown as 
ܿ௧ାଵ௨ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵݑ௧ ൅ ݌௧ାଵ. (7) 
Considering the distribution of V, the share of older people who are unemployed in 
the young period and who hope to work in the old period is given as ௏೟
∗
௏ഥ . ௧ܸ
∗ denotes 
older people V  who are indifferent between working and enjoying leisure during the 
older period. ௧ܸ∗ is given by the following condition: 
௧ܸ∗ ൌ ݈݊ ܴ௧ݑ௧ିଵ ൅
ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓ௧ ൅ ݌௧
ܴ௧ݑ௧ିଵ ൅ ݌௧ . (8) 
Therein, ௧ܸ∗∗  denotes older people V  who are indifferent between working and 
enjoying leisure in the older period in the case of older people who work in the young 
period and who hope to work in the older period. Then, the share of older people who 
work when young and who want to work in the old period is given as ௏೟
∗∗
௏ഥ . Also, ௧ܸ
∗∗ is 
given as the following condition. 
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௧ܸ∗∗ ൌ ݈݊ ܴ௧
ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ߠሻݓ௧ିଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓ௧ ൅ ݌௧
ܴ௧ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ߠሻݓ௧ିଵ ൅ ݌௧ . (9) 
With ݑ௧ ൏ ݓ௧, ௧ܸ∗ ൏ ௧ܸ∗∗ is obtainable.2 Many older people who are in employment as 
young people hope to work because consumption is at a low level without working in 
the older period. However, people who work in the young period obtain some 
consumption and want to enjoy leisure. 
 
2.2 Firms 
Firms produce the final goods to input capital stock ܭ௧  and labor ܮ௧ . The product 
function is assumed as 
௧ܻ ൌ ܣܭ௧ఌܮ௧ଵିఌ, 0 ൏ ߝ ൏ 1, 0 ൏ ܣ. (10) 
Therein, ௧ܻ denotes the output. The demand for labor and capital stock are given as 
ݓ௧ ൌ ܣሺ1 െ ߝሻܭ௧ఌܮ௧ି ఌ,  (11) 
ݎ௧ ൌ ܣߝܭ௧ఌିଵܮ௧ଵିఌ, (12) 
where ݓ௧ and ݎ௧ respectively denote the wage rate and rental rate for capital stock. 
Household saving is regarded as an annuity. Then, ܴ௧ ൌ ଵା௥೟௣  is obtainable: the capital 
income and the savings that deceased people have are equally distributed for living 
older people. For simplicity, these analyses assume no depreciation of capital stock. 
 
2.3 Government 
The government provides benefits for unemployed people. Then, the budget constraint 
of unemployment benefit is shown as 
ݑ௧ሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻ ൌ ݈߬௧ݓ௧. (13) 
Therein, ݈௧ denotes the employment rate. The population size of younger people who 
want to work in the young period is unity. The population size of older people who want 
to work in older people is given as ݈௧ିଵ ௏೟
∗∗
௏ഥ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ
௏೟∗
௏ഥ . However, only ݈௧ of younger 
people and ݈௧  of older people who want to work can work in t period. Then, the 
employment rate is given as shown below. 
                                                  
2 We assume that തܸ  is sufficiently large so as not to be ௏೟∗∗௏ഥ ൐ 1 or 
௏೟∗
௏ഥ ൐ 1. 
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݈௧ ൌ ܮ௧
1 ൅ ݌ ൬݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ
∗∗
തܸ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ ௧ܸ
∗
തܸ ൰
. (14) 
Defining ݇௧ ൌ ௄೟ଵା௣൬௟೟షభೇ೟∗∗ೇഥ ାሺଵି௟೟షభሻೇ೟
∗
ೇഥ ൰
, the wage rate (11) and interest rate (12) are 
ݓ௧ ൌ ܣሺ1 െ ߝሻ݇௧ఌ݈௧ି ఌ, (15) 
ݎ௧ ൌ ܣߝ݇௧ఌିଵ݈௧ଵିఌ. (16) 
The budget constraint of the policy of pension benefit and the subsidy for elderly labor 
is given by the following: 
݌݌௧ ൅ ݌ߪ݈௧ ൬݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ
∗∗
തܸ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ
௧ܸ∗
തܸ ൰ ൌ ߠ݈௧ݓ௧. (17) 
 
2.4 Labor Union 
In this model, there exists a labor union, which decides the wage rate and employment 
rate to maximize the following objective function:3  
ݒ௧ ൌ ൫ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ߠሻݓ௧ ൅ ݌ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓ௧൯݈௧ ൅ ݑ௧ሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻ ൅ ݌௧. (18) 
This equation shows the household average income in t period. Substituting (15) into 
(18), the employment rate to maximize ݒ௧ is derived as follows for given ݑ௧ and ݌௧.4 
݈௧ ൌ
ܣሺ1 െ ߝሻ ൬1 െ ߬ െ ߠ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ ௧ܸ
∗
തܸ ൅ ݌݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ
∗∗
തܸ ൰ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻ
߬ ൅ ܣሺ1 െ ߝሻ ൬1 െ ߬ െ ߠ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ ௧ܸ
∗
തܸ ൅ ݌݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ
∗∗
തܸ ൰ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻ
 (19) 
 
3. Temporary Equilibrium 
We consider the temporary equilibrium by which ݇௧, ݇௧ିଵ, ݈௧ିଵ are given as constant. 
Then, the employment rate in ݐ period is given as (19). 
First, we examine how an increase in survival rate ݌, that is, an increase in the aging 
process, affects the employment rate in t period. For simplicity, without pension benefit 
݌௧ାଵ and with the subsidy for elderly labor ߪ, an increase in ݌ raises the employment 
                                                  
3 This setting is the same as that with Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Ikeda (2016). Ono (2010) 
considers the labor union function including the household lifetime income. 
4 In this maximization, the labor union selects the employment rate for given ܸ∗, ܸ∗∗, ݑ௧. 
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rate ݈௧ as shown by (19). 
Second, we examine the effects of a subsidy for elderly labor on the employment rate. 
In this case, we assume no pension benefit: ݌௧ ൌ 0. Considering (8), (9), (17), and (19) 
and with total differentiation with respect to ݈௧, ߪ, ߠ, ௧ܸ∗, ௧ܸ∗∗ at the approximation of ߪ ൌ
0 and ߠ ൌ 0, ௗ௟೟ௗఙ is given as 
݈݀௧
݀ߪ ൌ
݌ሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻതܸ ቆሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ
߲ ௧ܸ∗߲ߪ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ
߲ ௧ܸ∗∗߲ߪ ቇ
ܤ െ ݌ሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻതܸ ቆሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ
߲ ௧ܸ∗߲݈௧ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ
߲ ௧ܸ∗∗߲݈௧ ቇ
, (20) 
where 
ܤ ൌ ߬ ൅ ଵିఌ௏ഥ ቀ1 െ ߬ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ
௏೟∗
௏ഥ ൅ ݌݈௧ିଵ
௏೟∗∗
௏ഥ ቁ. (21) 
The denominator of (20) is always a positive sign. Signs of డ௏೟
∗
డఙ  and 
డ௏೟∗∗
డఙ  are positive 
because an increase in the subsidy for elderly labor increases the opportunity cost of 
leisure. Considering (9) and (16), an increase in ݈௧	reduces wage rate ݓ௧ . For that 
reason, both ௧ܸ∗ and ௧ܸ∗∗ decrease: we obtain 
డ௏೟∗
డ௟೟ ൏ 0 and 
డ௏೟∗∗
డ௟೟ ൏ 0. Therefore, 
ௗ௟೟
ௗఙ ൐ 0. 
An increase in subsidies for elderly labor raises the employment rate. 
Third, we examine the effect of the pension benefit on the employment rate. In this 
case, we assume no subsidy for elderly labor ߪ ൌ 0 and ݌௧ ൐ 0. Considering (8), (9), (17), 
and (19) and with total differentiation with respect to ݈௧, ߠ, ௧ܸ∗, ௧ܸ∗∗ at the approximation 
of ߠ ൌ 0, ௗ௟೟ௗఏ is given as shown below. 
݈݀௧
݀ߠ ൌ
െሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻ݈௧ݓ௧̅ݒ ቆሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ
߲ ௧ܸ∗߲݌௧ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ
߲ ௧ܸ∗∗߲݌௧ ቇ
ܤ െ ݌ሺ1 െ ߝሻሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻതܸ ቆሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ
߲ ௧ܸ∗߲݈௧ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ
߲ ௧ܸ∗∗߲݈௧ ቇ
 (22) 
An increase in ݌௧ increases consumption. Older people want to enjoy leisure because 
the utility from the leisure is greater than that from consumption. Then, the signs of 
both డ௏೟
∗
డ௣೟ and 
డ௏೟∗∗
డ௣೟  are negative. We can obtain 
ௗ௟೟
ௗఏ ൏ 0. Therefore, we can establish the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
An increase in the share of older people to total population size and the subsidy for 
elderly labor raises the employment rate of both young and elderly people. However, an 
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increase in the pension benefit reduces the labor participation rate of both young and 
elderly people. 
 
We would like to explain why this proposition is obtainable. An increase in ݌ raises 
the first term of the labor union objective function (18). Then, an increase in ݈௧ raises 
the labor union objective function ݒ௧ greatly before increasing ݌. Therefore, the labor 
union increases the employment rate ݈௧. Similarly, an increase in the subsidy for elderly 
labor raises the first term of the labor union objective function (18). Then, an increase 
in ݈௧  raises the labor union objective function ݒ௧  to a greater level than before the 
increase in the subsidy rate ߪ, even if an increase in ߪ	 brings about a negative effect 
on ݈௧ because of the tax burden. 
An increase in ߠ to raise the pension benefit reduces the employment rate. As shown 
by the first term of the labor union objective function (18), an increase in ߠ decreases 
ݒ௧ for given ݈௧. This result shows that the positive effect of an increase in ߠ on ݒ௧ is 
weakened. Therefore, the labor union decreases ݈௧. 
Moreover, we can infer the change of the share of older people who hope to work in 
the old period. Increases in ݌ and ߪ raise both ௧ܸ∗ and ௧ܸ∗∗, as shown by (8) and (9). 
Therefore, the number of older people hoping to work rises. Inversely, an increase in 
pension benefit increases both ௧ܸ∗ and ௧ܸ∗∗, as shown by (8) and (9). The number of older 
people hoping to work decreases. 
We notify the definition of employment rate ݈௧ , which is given as (19). The 
employment rate of both young and elderly people is given as ݈௧. However, the labor 
supply size differs. Although the young labor supply is given as ݈௧, the labor supply of 
elderly people is given as 
݈௧൫ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ ௧ܸ∗ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ∗∗൯. (23) 
Proposition 1 shows that both young labor supply and labor supply of elderly people 
increases because of the subsidy for the labor supply of elderly people and decreases 
because of the pension benefit. Although the labor participation of younger people is 
given by ݈௧, the labor participation of elderly people is given by (23). This definition 
includes elderly people who want to work during the old period. An increase in ݌ and 
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ߪ increases ௧ܸ∗ and ௧ܸ∗∗. Then the labor participation of elderly people rises. 
 
4. Steady State Equilibrium 
This section presents examination of the steady state equilibrium. The aggregate 
saving is given as ݈௧ݏ௧௪ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻݑ௧. Considering the capital market equilibrium ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ
݈௧ݏ௧௪ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻݑ௧, the dynamics of ܭ௧ are derived as 
ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻܣሺ1 െ ߝሻܭ௧ఌ ቆ1 ൅ ݌തܸ ሺሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ ௧ܸ∗ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ∗∗ሻቇ
ିఌ
݈௧ଵିఌ. (24) 
The dynamics of employment rate ݈௧  is given by equation (19). For given ܭ௧, ݈௧  and 
considering (8), (9), (11), (12), (14), and (17) without pension benefit ݌௧ , we obtain 
ܭ௧ାଵ, ݈௧ାଵ. 
Defining ܭ, ݈ as the capital stock and employment rate in the steady state, ܭ, ݈ are 
given by the following equations based on (8), (9), (11), (12), (14), (17), (19), and (24). 
ܭ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻܣሺ1 െ ߝሻܭఌ ቆ1 ൅ ݌തܸ ൫ሺ1 െ ݈ሻܸ∗ ൅ ݈ܸ∗∗൯ቇ
ିఌ
݈ଵିఌ. (25) 
݈ ൌ
ܣሺ1 െ ߝሻ ቀ1 െ ߬ െ ߠ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ݈ሻ ܸ∗തܸ ൅ ݌݈
ܸ∗∗
തܸ ቁ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻ
߬ ൅ ܣሺ1 െ ߝሻ ቀ1 െ ߬ െ ߠ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ݈ሻ ܸ∗തܸ ൅ ݌݈
ܸ∗∗
തܸ ቁ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻ
. (26) 
ܸ∗ ൌ ݈݊ ܴ
݈߬
1 െ ݈ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻ
ܴ . 
(27) 
ܸ∗∗ ൌ ݈݊ ܴ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻܴ . (28) 
w ൌ ܣሺ1 െ ߝሻܭఌ ቆ1 ൅ ݌തܸ ൫ሺ1 െ ݈ሻܸ∗ ൅ ݈ܸ∗∗൯ቇ
ିఌ
݈ିఌ. (29) 
1 ൅ ݎ ൌ ܣߝܭఌିଵ ቆ1 ൅ ݌തܸ ൫ሺ1 െ ݈ሻܸ∗ ൅ ݈ܸ∗∗൯ቇ
ଵିఌ
݈ଵିఌ. (30) 
݌ߪ
തܸ ሺሺ1 െ ݈ሻܸ∗ ൅ ݈ܸ∗∗ሻ ൌ ߠ݈ݓ. (31) 
The linear approximation of (19) and (23) at the approximation of ܭ, ݈ is reduced to 
the following equations: 
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൬ܭ௧ାଵ െ ܭ݈௧ାଵ െ ݈ ൰ ൌ
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
߲ܭ௧ାଵ
߲ܭ௧
߲ܭ௧ାଵ
߲݈௧
߲݈௧ାଵ
߲ܭ௧
߲݈௧ାଵ
߲݈௧ ی
ۋ
ۊ൬ܭ௧ െ ܭ݈௧ െ ݈ ൰. (32) 
Depending on the trace డ௄೟శభడ௄೟ ൅
డ௟೟శభ
డ௄೟  and the determinant 
డ௄೟శభ
డ௄೟
డ௟೟శభ
డ௄೟ െ
డ௄೟శభ
డ௟೟
డ௟೟శభ
డ௄೟ , the 
stability of the steady state equilibrium is determined. This section presents an 
examination of the effect of an aging society and the subsidy for elderly labor on the 
employment in the steady state as a long-term effect of policy. However, we cannot 
derive these effects analytically. Therefore, using numerical examples, we derive the 
subsidy policy effects. 
In numerical examples, we set the parameter as the following table. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here.] 
 
Then, we obtain 1 ൅ r ൌ 1.595. If the interest rate per year is 1.5%, the interest rate 
of the overlapping generations model by which a period is regarded as 30 years is about 
56%. This rate is nearly the same as that found from recent data of OECD countries. In 
this parameter setting, we obtain ௨௪ ൌ 0.6. The benefit rate of unemployment in Japan 
is set as 50–80%. Then, 0.6 is an inappropriate value for consideration in the case of 
Japan. ݌ denotes the survival rate. We set ݌ ൌ 0.9. As reported from data of Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan “Simple Life Table,” the survival rate by which 
zero-year-old people can survive until sixty years old is about 0.9. 
The following table presents the effects of the subsidy for elderly labor ߪ. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here.] 
 
As shown by the table, the employment rate is almost unchanged by the subsidy for 
elderly labor. Labor opportunities of younger people are not prevented by the subsidy 
policy. The wage rate decreases. The subsidy policy is not valid to raise the employment 
rate of older people. The labor supply of elderly people given by (23) rises because of an 
increase in ܸ∗∗. However, an increase in σ	does not change ܸ∗. Therefore, the subsidy 
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policy is not valid for older people who were unemployed during the  young period. 
Generally, unemployed people face a poor situation. The results of our paper 
demonstrate that a subsidy policy to facilitate labor supply is not effective. 
  
[Insert Table 3 around here.] 
 
We derive the degree to which an increase in ݌ affects the employment rate and 
other parameters. The results are presented in Table 3. The employment rate is not 
changed, but the labor participation of elderly people given by (23) rises. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our paper presents an examination of how an aging society and the subsidy for elderly 
labor affects the employment rate and labor supply of both young and elderly people. 
As a consequence of temporary effects described in our paper, an aging society increases 
the labor participation rate of both younger people and older people in a model in which 
the labor union decides the employment rate and wage rate. In addition, the subsidy 
for elderly labor raises the employment rate and labor supply of both younger people 
and older people. These results demonstrate that the factor or policy to increase the 
labor supply of older people does not crowd out the labor supply of younger people. By 
virtue of an increase in the labor participation rate of older people, the employment rate 
of younger people rises.  Therefore, crowding out effect does not occur for the labor 
supply of younger people. 
Considering the steady state equilibrium in the closed economy, even if the subsidy 
is provided, the employment rate does not change for either young or elderly people. 
However, the labor supply of elderly people rises. This result demonstrates that the 
effects of elderly labor differ between a temporal and steady state equilibrium. In 
addition, the relations between young and elderly labor change. 
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Appendix 
A. Derivation of (20) 
Total differentiation of (19) with respect to ݈௧, ߪ, ߠ	at the approximation of ߪ ൌ 0 and 
ߠ ൌ 0, we obtain the following equation of 
ܤ݈݀௧ െ ሺ1 െ ߝሻ݈௧݀ߠ ൅ ଵ݈ܺ௧݀ߪ ൅ ܺଶ݈௧݀ߪ ൅ ܺଷ݈௧݈݀௧
ൌ െሺ1 െ ߝሻ݀ߠ ൅ ଵܺ݀ߪ ൅ ܺଶ݀ߪ ൅ ܺଷ݈݀௧, 
(A.1)
where 
ଵܺ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߝሻ݌
̅ݒ ൫ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ ௧ܸ
∗ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ∗∗൯, (A.2) 
ܺଶ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߝሻ݌
̅ݒ ൭ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ
߲ ௧ܸ∗
߲ߪ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ
߲ ௧ܸ∗∗
߲ߪ ൱, (A.3) 
ܺଷ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߝሻ݌
̅ݒ ൭ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ
߲ ௧ܸ∗
߲݈௧ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ
߲ ௧ܸ∗∗
߲݈௧ ൱. (A.4) 
  Total differentiation of (17) with respect to ݈௧, ߪ, ߠ	at the approximation of ߪ ൌ 0 and 
ߠ ൌ 0, we obtain the following equation as 
݀ߠ ൌ ଵܺ݀ߪ. (A.5) 
  We note that this section presents examination of the temporary effect for given the 
policy parameters in ݐ െ 1 period: (9) is shown by the following equation as 
௧ܸ∗∗ ൌ ݈݊ ܴ௧
ሺ1 െ ߬௧ିଵ െ ߠ௧ିଵሻݓ௧ିଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻݓ௧
ܴ௧ሺ1 െ ߬௧ିଵ െ ߠ௧ିଵሻݓ௧ିଵ . (A.6) 
Then, we obtain  డ௏೟
∗
డఏ ൌ 0 because ߠ௧ିଵ shows the policy parameter in the prior period. 
Considering (A.1)–(A.6), we obtain (20). 
 
B. Derivation of (22) 
Total differentiation of (19) with respect to ݈௧, ߠ, ݌௧	at the approximation of ݌௧ ൌ 0 and 
ߠ ൌ 0, we obtain the following equation of 
ܤ݈݀௧ െ ሺ1 െ ߝሻ݈௧݀ߠ ൅ ܺଷ݈௧݈݀௧ ൅ ܺସ݈௧݀݌௧
ൌ െሺ1 െ ߝሻ݀ߠ ൅ ଵܺ݀ߪ ൅ ܺଶ݀ߪ ൅ ܺଷ݈݀௧ ൅ ܺସ݀݌௧, 
(B.1) 
where 
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ܺସ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߝሻ݌
̅ݒ ൭ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ
߲ ௧ܸ∗
߲݌௧ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ
߲ ௧ܸ∗∗
߲݌௧ ൱, (B.2) 
Total differentiation of (17) with respect to ݈௧, ݌௧, ߠ	at the approximation of ߪ ൌ 0 and 
ߠ ൌ 0, we obtain 
݀݌௧ ൌ ݈௧ݓ௧݌ ݀ߠ. (B.3) 
  Considering (A.2)–(A.6), (B.1)–(B.3), we obtain (22). 
 
C. Dynamics of ࡷ࢚ and ࢒࢚ 
The dynamics of ܭ௧  and ݈௧  with no pension and no subsidy for elderly labor are 
specified by the following equations for given ܭ௧ିଵ and ݈௧ିଵ.  
 
[Insert Fig.2 around here.] 
 
Then, as shown in Fig. 2, the dynamics is locally stable for given parameters shown 
by Table 1. 
ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻܣሺ1 െ ߝሻܭ௧ఌ ቆ1 ൅ ݌തܸ ሺሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻ ௧ܸ∗ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ∗∗ሻቇ
ିఌ
݈௧ଵିఌ. (C.1) 
݈௧ ൌ
ܣሺ1 െ ߝሻ ൬1 െ ߬ െ ߠ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ ௧ܸ
∗
തܸ ൅ ݌݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ
∗∗
തܸ ൰ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻ
߬ ൅ ܣሺ1 െ ߝሻ ൬1 െ ߬ െ ߠ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ݈௧ିଵሻ ௧ܸ
∗
തܸ ൅ ݌݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ
∗∗
തܸ ൰ ሺ1 ൅ ߪሻ
. (C.2) 
௧ܸ∗ ൌ ݈݊ ܴ௧ݑ௧ିଵ ൅ ݓ௧ܴ௧ݑ௧ିଵ . (C.3) 
௧ܸ∗∗ ൌ ݈݊ ܴ௧
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓ௧ିଵ ൅ ݓ௧
ܴ௧ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓ௧ିଵ . (C.4) 
ݓ௧ ൌ ܣሺ1 െ ߝሻܭ௧ఌ 	ቆ1 ൅ ݌തܸ ሺሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻ ௧ܸ∗ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ∗∗ሻቇ
ିఌ
݈௧ି ఌ. (C.5) 
ݎ௧ ൌ ܣߝܭ௧ఌିଵ ቆ1 ൅ ݌തܸ ሺሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻ ௧ܸ∗ ൅ ݈௧ିଵ ௧ܸ∗∗ሻቇ
ଵିఌ
݈௧ଵିఌ. (C.6) 
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ܴ௧ ൌ 1 ൅ ݎ௧݌ . (C.7) 
ݑ௧ሺ1 െ ݈௧ሻ ൌ ݈߬௧ݓ௧. (C.8) 
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Fig. 1: Elderly labor force participation rate (2016; more than 65 years old) (Data: 
OECD data “Employment, labor force participation rate”). 
 
 
Fig. 2: Transition path of ܭ௧ାଵ and ݈௧ାଵ. 
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ߪ 0 
ߝ 0.3 
߬ 0.025 
ܣ 0.6 
p 0.9 
തܸ  1 
 
Table 1: Parameter setting 
 
σ l w V* V** u/w 1+ r θ
0 0.9593 0.2486 0.6854 0.4670 0.5894 1.5509 0
0.025 0.9594 0.2421 0.6854 0.4871 0.5909 1.5857 0.0480
0.05 0.9593 0.2346 0.6847 0.5098 0.5896 1.6303 0.1033
 
Table 2: Effects of subsidies on employment, wage rate, and others 
 
p l w V* V** u/w 1+ r
0.9 0.9593 0.2486 0.6854 0.4670 0.5894 1.5509
0.95 0.9602 0.2462 0.6870 0.4768 0.6031 1.5948  
Table 3: Effects of an aging society on employment, wage rate, and others 
 
